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Abstract
This paper articulates and defends a suppositional interpretation of conditional
degree of belief. First, I focus on a type of probability that has a crucial role in
Bayesian inference: conditional degrees of belief in an observation, given a sta-
tistical hypothesis. The suppositional analysis explains, unlike other accounts,
why these degrees of belief track the corresponding probability density func-
tions. Then, I extend the suppositional analysis and argue that all probabilities
in Bayesian inference should be understood suppositionally and model-relative.
This sheds a new and illuminating light on chance-credence coordination princi-
ples, the relationship between Bayesian models and their target system, and the
epistemic significance of Bayes’ Theorem.
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1 Introduction
Bayesian inference is a well-established theory of inductive reasoning that represents
an agent’s epistemic attitudes—their degrees of belief—by the laws of probability (e.g.,
Jeffrey, 1971; Savage, 1972; de Finetti, 1972; Earman, 1992; Bovens and Hartmann, 2003;
Howson and Urbach, 2006). For a scientific hypothesis H, p(H) represents a rational
agent’s degree of belief that H is true. Upon learning a proposition E, the agent
changes her degrees of belief in H according to Conditionalization: pE(H) = p(H|E).
That is, the agent’s posterior degree of belief in H is set equal to the conditional
degree of belief in H given E. This posterior probability p(H|E) is used as a basis
for judgments of acceptance and decision-making and can be calculated from Bayes’
Theorem:
p(H|E) = p(H) p(E|H)
p(E)
(Bayes’ Theorem)
In other words, the degree of belief that a rational agent has in hypothesis H after
learning E depends on three factors: her prior degree of belief in H, her prior degree
of belief in E, and her conditional degree of belief in E given H.
In this paper, I investigate the semantics and epistemology of probabilities of the
type p(E|H): conditional degrees of belief in an observation, given a hypothesis that
makes statistical predictions (henceforth, “statistical hypothesis”). Notwithstanding
the salience of these probabilities in Bayesian inference, this question is rarely investi-
gated systematically.
The negative part of the paper argues why standard views of Bayesian inference
cannot fully describe the epistemic role of these degrees of belief (Section 2). In par-
ticular, chance-credence coordination principles fail to explain why these conditional
degrees of belief are rationally constrained by the corresponding probability densities.
Then I discuss (and reject) the proposal to reduce conditional to unconditional degrees
of belief (Section 3).
In the constructive part of the paper, I develop a suppositional analysis of condi-
tional degrees of belief: conditional degrees of the type p(E|H) are the degrees of belief
that we have in the occurrence of E upon supposing that the target system is fully de-
scribed by H (Section 4). Then, I explore the wider implications of the suppositional
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analysis. I argue that all probabilities in Bayesian inference should be understood
suppositionally and model-relative. Finally, I develop a new interpretation of Bayes’
Theorem as a coherence constraint between different probability functions and I ex-
plain how suppositional and possibly counterfactual degrees of belief can contribute
to reliable predictions about the real world (Section 5). I conclude by wrapping up the
results of the paper (Section 6).
Overall, this research elucidates how an adequate semantics and epistemology of
conditional degree of belief leads to a better understanding of Bayesian inference as a
whole. The proposed analysis also clarifies the role of chance-credence coordination in
scientific inference. Moreover, it solves some pertinent problems of Bayesian reasoning,
such as the interpretation of degrees of belief in hypotheses that are part of highly
idealized models. Finally, it provides the conceptual groundwork for applications of
Bayesian inference in statistics and other domains of science.
The suppositional approach to conditional degrees of belief is not entirely novel.
Ramsey (1926) has famously argued that conditional degrees of belief are determined
by supposing the antecedent (i.e., the proposition that is conditioned on) and rea-
soning on that basis about the consequent (i.e., the proposition whose probability is
evaluated). Also, it is related to philosophical discussions about the status of condi-
tional probability (e.g., Ha´jek, 2003; Fitelson and Ha´jek, 2017). However, my paper is,
to the best of my knowledge, the first to explore the implications of Ramsey’s proposal
for Bayesian inference and inductive reasoning.
2 The Equality and Chance-Credence Coordination
What constrains conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a hypothesis
H? Suppose that we toss a coin in order to learn about its bias—a simple and trans-
parent case of inductive inference. The hypotheses (Hθ , θ ∈ [0, 1]) describe the chance
of the coin to come up heads on any individual toss. When we toss the coin N times,
our sample space is S = {0, 1}N . Under the assumption that the tosses are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (henceforth, i.i.d.), we can describe the probability
of observation Ek (=k heads and N − k tails) by the Binomial probability distribu-
tion and the corresponding probability density function ρHθ (Ek) = (
N
k ) θ
k (1− θ)N−k.
More generally, the sample space S together with the set of probability distributions
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over S induced by the ρHθ constitutes a statistical model (e.g. Cox and Hinkley, 1974;
Bernardo and Smith, 1994; McCullagh, 2002).
Suppose N = 3 and let H be the hypothesis is that the coin is fair, H: θ = 1/2.
Then, the probability of observing two heads in three tosses (=E) is described by
ρH(E) = (32) (1/2)
2 (1− 1/2)3−2 = 3/8. Bayesian reasoners in the sciences take these
probabilities as plug-ins for their conditional degrees of belief p(E|Hθ) (e.g., Bernardo
and Smith, 1994; Howson and Urbach, 2006). And since the former are uniquely de-
termined, so are the latter. Agents with divergent priors will approach each other’s
views in the posterior distribution. Uniquely rational values for p(E|Hθ) have an im-
portant epistemic function: they work toward establishing (approximate) consensus
on posterior distributions, and they lead to unanimous assessments of the strength of
observed evidence. For instance, the Bayes factor between two hypothesis H1 and H0,
a popular measure of evidence in Bayesian statistics (Jeffreys, 1961; Lee and Wagen-
makers, 2013), is just a ratio of conditional probabilities: BF10(E) = p(E|H1)/p(E|H0).
All this presupposes, however, a satisfactory answer to the the main question of the
paper:
Main Question What justifies the equality between conditional degrees of belief and
the corresponding probability densities?
p(E|H) = ρH(E) (The Equality)
A tempting way to justify The Equality consists in deriving it from a general epistemic
norm: a chance-credence coordination principle that calibrates subjective degree of
belief with objective chance (e.g., Lewis, 1980; Strevens, 1999; Williamson, 2007, 2010).
For instance, according to the Principle of Direct Inference (PDI) (e.g., Reichenbach,
1949; Kyburg, 1974; Levi, 1977), if I know that a coin is fair, I should assign degree of
belief 1/2 that heads will come up. David Lewis (1980) formalized a related intuition
in his Principal Principle (PP): the initial credence function of a rational agent, con-
ditional on the proposition that the physical chance of E takes value x, should also be
equal to x.
Do these principles apply to The Equality? Not straightforwardly so. Presumably,
the Principle of Direct Inference (or its close cousin, the Principal Principle) would
recommend to carry over the value of ρH(E) to the conditional degree of belief p(E|H).
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After all, ρH does not depend on subjective epistemic attitudes, just on the properties
of the statistical model. In this sense, it seems to qualify as an objective chance.
Note, however, that objective chances make empirical statements: their values de-
pend on “facts entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes in the actual
world” (Hoefer, 2007, 549, original emphasis), such as the setup of an experiment or
the physical composition of the coin we toss. This is true of frequencies, propensities,
and best-system chances alike. Our case is different: the truth value of sentences such
as ρH(E) = 3/8 is entirely internal to the statistical model: if H denotes the hypothesis
that the coin is fair and E denotes the observation of two tosses, then it is part of the
meaning of H that the probability of E given H is 3/8. That is, the sentence
When we perform three i.i.d. tosses of a fair coin, the chance of observing
two heads is 3/8.
(+)
has no empirical content—it has a distinctly analytical flavor. It does not refer to real-
world properties or events; in fact, no fair coins need to exist for this sentence to be
true. In other words, ρH(E) describes an objective, but not an ontic probability; its
value is subject-independent, but not a physical chance (Rosenthal, 2004; Sprenger,
2010).
The Principle of Direct Inference or the Principal Principle do not apply to this case,
at least not without further qualification. They coordinate our degrees of belief with
properties of the actual world, such as observed relative frequencies or known propen-
sities. But the objective probabilities in question, ρH(E), do not make any statements
about the actual world. Therefore, the usual chance-credence coordination principles
cannot justify The Equality.
The rest of the paper will be devoted to finding a semantics for conditional degree
of belief that explains The Equality and elucidates the role of chance-credence coordi-
nation in statistical inference. We first discuss a radical proposal: to reduce conditional
to unconditional degree of belief.
3 Ratio Analysis
According to most textbooks on probability theory, statistics and (formal) epistemol-
ogy, the conditional probability of E given H is defined as the ratio of the probability
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of the conjunction of both propositions, divided by the probability of H (Jackson, 1991;
Earman, 1992; Skyrms, 2000; Howson and Urbach, 2006).
p(E|H) := p(E∧H)
p(H)
(Ratio Analysis)
By applying a Dutch Book argument, we can transfer this reductive analysis of condi-
tional probability to conditional degree of belief. It can be shown that the conditional
degree of belief in E given H, operationalized by a bet on E that is called off if ¬H,
must be equal to the ratio of the unconditional degrees of belief in E∧H and H. Oth-
erwise, the agent will be susceptible to a Dutch book (e.g., Easwaran, 2011a). Ratio
Analysis is therefore uncontroversial as a mathematical constraint on rational condi-
tional degrees of belief. What is at stake is a semantic question: can Ratio Analysis
figure as a definition of conditional degree of belief? That is, do conditional degrees
of belief p(E|H) just impose constraints on the ratio of p(E∧H) and p(H) and have
no independent significance? If this were the case, then our search for a semantics of
conditional degrees of belief would pursue a Scheinproblem.
The classical line of attack against Ratio Analysis contends that we can often make
sense of p(E|H) although p(H) = 0 (e.g., de Finetti, 1972; Ha´jek, 2003; Fitelson and
Ha´jek, 2017). Intuitively, such conditional degrees of belief seem to be well-defined,
e.g., in the question “What is the probability that a point on Earth is in the Western
hemisphere (E), given that it lies on the equator (H)?”. To make sense of such ques-
tions, Ratio Analysis needs to be amended substantially, and then we are in the middle
of a highly technical debate (e.g., Howson and Urbach, 2006; Easwaran, 2011b; Myr-
vold, 2015). Actually, I find the probability zero objection appealing, but it would be
rash to conclude that it deals a lethal blow to Ratio Analysis. Going into the details
of this debate would go beyond the scope of this paper. It is also not necessary: the
thesis that conditional degrees can be reduced to unconditional degrees of belief has
other shortcomings.
The first objection is mainly descriptive: Ratio Analysis fails to do justice to the
cognitive role of conditional degrees of belief. Intuitively, Ratio Analysis seems to miss
something essential: we usually assess conditional degrees of belief p(E|H) in a direct
way, rather than by reasoning about p(E∧H) and p(H), and calculating their ratio.
The latter route carries a high cognitive load, and in many cases, such as the coin toss
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example, we can easily determine p(E|H) by reasoning about the likely consequences
of H. Indeed, recent psychological evidence demonstrates that Ratio Analysis is a poor
description of how people reason with conditional probabilities (Zhao et al., 2009).
Second, Ratio Analysis fails to grasp the normative role of conditional degree of
belief in statistical inference. In the previous section, we have seen that it is part
of the meaning of H to constrain p(E|H) in a unique way. Recall the example. For
determining our rational degree of belief that a fair coin yields a particular sequence
of heads and tails, it does not matter whether the coin in question is actually fair.
Regardless of our degree of belief in that proposition, we all agree that given that the
coin is fair, the probability of two heads in three tosses is 3/8. On Ratio Analysis, this
feature of conditional degree of belief drops out of the picture. p(E|H) is constrained
only via constraints on p(E∧H) and p(H). But suppose we suspend judgment on
p(E∧H) and p(H), or we have imprecise degrees of belief about these probabilities.
Even then, the (unique) constraints on p(E|H) would still be in place. Ratio Analysis
therefore misses an important normative aspect of reasoning with conditional degrees
of belief.
A consequence of these arguments is that conditional degree of belief is an equally
fundamental a concept as unconditional degree of belief. The former cannot be re-
duced to the latter. The reverse direction—defining unconditional degrees in terms of
conditional degrees of belief (e.g., Popper, 1959/2002; Re´nyi, 1970)—is more promis-
ing: in fact, on the view of Bayesian inference that we will end up defending, all
relevant probabilities happen to be conditional degrees of belief.
4 The Suppositional Analysis
Between the lines, the previous sections have already anticipated an alternative anal-
ysis of conditional degree of belief: a suppositional interpretation. That is, we deter-
mine our degrees of belief in E given H by supposing that H is true.1
There are two great figures in philosophy of probability associated with this view.
1I call my account “suppositional” instead of “counterfactual” since in some cases, no counterfactual
assumptions are necessary. On the other hand, many applications of statistical models in scientific infer-
ence imply straightforward counterfactual assumptions; and whenever I want to emphasize this point,
I use the adjective “counterfactual” (analysis, interpretation, ...) instead of the more general “supposi-
tional”.
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One is the British philosopher Frank P. Ramsey, the other is the Italian statistician
Bruno de Finetti (1972, 2008). I will focus on Ramsey’s view since de Finetti also
requires that H be a verifiable event if p(E|H) is to be meaningful (de Finetti, 1972,
193). This verificiationism is unnecessarily restrictive.
Here is Ramsey’s famous analysis of conditional degrees of belief:
If two people are arguing ’if H will E?’ and both are in doubt as to H, they
are adding H hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on
that basis about E. (Ramsey, 1926)
The above quote is ambiguous: it is about conditional degree of belief or the truth
conditions of conditionals? Many philosophers, most famously Stalnaker (1968, 1975),
were inspired by the latter reading and developed an epistemology of conditionals
based on the idea that assessing the conditional “If H, then E” involves adding H to
one’s background knowledge.
I would like to stay neutral on all issues concerning conditionals and interpret
Ramsey’s quote as an analysis of conditional degrees of belief. Indeed, in the sentence
that follows the above quote, Ramsey describes the reasoning procedure in question
as
We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in E given H. (ibid., my
emphasis)
This makes clear that regardless of the possible link to the epistemology of condition-
als, Ramsey intended that hypothetically assuming H would determine one’s condi-
tional degrees of belief in E, given H. That is, p(E|H) is the rational degree of belief in
E if we suppose that H is true and draw conclusions about E on the basis of H.
When applied to Bayesian inference, this analysis of conditional degree of belief
asks us to imagine a possible world ωH where H is the probability law that governs
the frequency of possible observations. The term “possible world” is intended in a
quite restrictive sense: not as a full description of the actual world, but as specifying a
way the target system (e.g., the coin toss) could be. Supposing a statistical hypothesis
H means conceiving of the target system as governed by physical chance, with the
probability of an observation E given by the probability density ρH(E).
Let us return to the coin-tossing example. Let H denote the hypothesis that the coin
is fair. We are now supposing H and reason, within ωH, about the degrees of belief that
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we should have in the occurrence of certain sequences of heads and tails. Denote the
function that describes our degrees of belief in these observations by pωH (·). From the
above it follows that in ωH, the (physical) chance of two heads in two tosses is 1/4, the
chance of two heads in three tosses is 3/8, and so on. Within ωH, we can now apply a
chance-credence coordination principle such as the Principle of Direct Inference (PDI)
or the Principal Principle (PP). After all, ρH qualifies as a physical chance within ωH
and we have no reason to challenge the rationality of PDI or PP in this case.2 Thus,
our (unconditional!) degrees of belief within ωH should satisfy pωH (E) = ρH(E).
By definition of the suppositional analysis, we also have p(E|H) = pωH (E). Thus
we obtain p(E|H) = ρH(E) and we conclude that conditional degrees of belief track
probability density functions. Hence, the suppositional analysis of conditional degree
of belief directly yields The Equality, and it explains why sentences such as (+) appear
analytic.
Supposing H may be in conflict with available background knowledge about the
target system. For this reason, my interpretation of conditional degree of belief dif-
fers from Ramsey’s in a crucial nuance: where Ramsey suggested that H is added to
existing background knowledge, H may also overrule conflicting knowledge about the
target system on my account. In such cases, we obtain a genuinely counterfactual in-
terpretation of conditional degree of belief. This is often necessary: a given coin may
not be perfectly fair, the tosses are not i.i.d., and so on. How to use counterfactual
degrees of belief for drawing conclusions about the real world is a question that we
will tackle in the next section.
It is important to understand the role of the Principle of Direct Inference and the
Principal Principle in the suppositional analysis. Both principles apply to real-world,
ontic chances, e.g., “the chance of this atom decaying in the next hour is 1/3” or “the
chance of a zero in the spin of this roulette wheel is 1/37”. The principles simply claim
that degrees of belief should mirror such chances. Compare this to the picture that we
sketch for conditional degree of belief. We do not deal with real-world chances; rather
we observe that in the world ωH described by H, the objective chance of E is given by
2Note that pωH is really an initial credence function, as PP demands: information about the actual
world ω@ that may conflict with H is overridden by supposing H and moving to ωH . Complications
induced by inadmissible information (e.g., Lewis, 1980; Hoefer, 2007) do not occur in most cases because
the worlds ωH are so simple and well-behaved. The events in ωH are elements of the sample space S
and H assigns a definite and unambiguous probability to them.
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ρH(E). In other words, we do not apply PDI/PP in the actual world ω@, but in the
counterfactual world ωH described by H, and within that world, we adapt our degree
of belief in E to ρH(E). By supposing a world where the occurrence of E is genuinely
chancy, the suppositional analysis explains why our conditional degree of belief in E
given H is uniquely determined and obeys The Equality.
Thus, we can explain why chance-credence coordination is so important for proba-
bilistic reasoning, without committing ourselves to the existence or nature of physical
chance in the actual world. This is a distinct strength of the proposed account of con-
ditional degree of belief. Scientists need to calibrate their degrees of belief with objec-
tive probabilities gained from statistical models, but the soundness of their inference
should not depend on establishing that these probabilities are limiting frequencies,
propensities, or any other sort of objective chance to which PDI and PP apply. Given
the prevalence of statistical inference in all areas of science, and the ongoing discussion
about whether genuine chances exist outside some subfields of physics and biology,
one may even conclude that the use of chance-credence coordination principles in hy-
pothetical, idealized worlds is more important for science than their use for relating
actual physical chances to our degrees of belief.
Let us wrap up the essence of my proposal. We interpret p(E|H), the conditional
degree of belief in observation E given statistical hypothesis H, by supposing that H
is the true model of the target system. In this hypothetical or counterfactual scenario,
we coordinate our degree of belief in E with the known objective chance of E, given by
ρH(E) (Lewis, 1980). To repeat, we are talking about chance-credence coordination in
hypothetical worlds where the space of possible events (=the sampling space) is deter-
mined by the statistical model, not about chance-credence coordination in the actual
world ω@. Probability density functions inform our hypothetical degrees of belief, not
our actual degrees of belief.
This interpretation of conditional degree of belief also matches the practice of non-
Bayesian inference. Here are the thoughts of the great frequentist statistician Ronald
A. Fisher on conditional probability in hypothesis testing:
In general tests of significance are based on hypothetical probabilities
calculated from their null hypotheses. They do not lead to any probability
statements about the real world. (Fisher, 1956, 44, original emphasis)
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That is, Fisher is emphatic that the probabilities of evidence given some hypothesis
have hypothetical character and are not physically realized objective chances. Probabil-
ities are useful instruments of inference, not components of the actual world. Accord-
ing to Fisher, statistical reasoning and hypothesis testing is essentially counterfactual—
it is about the probability of a certain dataset if we suppose the tested “null” hypoth-
esis. The null hypothesis usually denotes the absence of any effect, the additivity of
two factors, the causal independence of two variables in a model, etc. In most cases,
it is strictly speaking false: there will be some minimal effect in the treatment, some
slight deviation from additivity, some negligible causal interaction between the vari-
ables (e.g., Gallistel, 2009). Our statistical inferences are based on the probabilities of
events under a hypothesis which we know to be false—although it may be a good
idealization of reality. The suppositional interpretation of conditional degree of be-
lief naturally fits into the practice of statistical inference with its emphasis on testing
idealized point hypotheses, e.g., in null hypothesis significance testing.
So far we have applied the suppositional analysis to exactly one variety of (condi-
tional) degree of belief. We will now demonstrate that it is also a fruitful framework
for interpreting the degree of belief in a hypothesis, given a statistical model.
5 Implications: Model-Relative Bayesian Inference and Bayes’
Theorem
My proposal has been silent on the demarcation of the statistical hypothesis H vis-a`-
vis the background assumptions that are part of the statistical model M. Consider
the coin-tossing case. When we evaluate p(E|H) with H = “the coin is fair”, we as-
sume that the individual tosses of the coin are independent and identically distributed.
However, this assumption is not part of H itself: H just describes the tendency of the
coin on any particular toss. If we contrast H to some alternative H’, we notice that dif-
ferences between them are typically expressed in terms of parameter values, such as H:
θ = 1/2 versus H’: θ = 2/3, H”: θ > 1/2, etc. Crucial assumptions on the experimen-
tal setup, such as independence and identical distribution of the coin tosses, do not
enter the particular hypothesis we are testing. In a sense, p(E|H) is underdetermined
because so much supplementary information about the experiment is missing.
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Thus, we have to make the role of our background assumptions explicit. There
are two layers of statistical modeling. First, there is the general statistical model
M = (S ;P) where S denotes the sample space, and P denotes the set of probability
distributions over S . What counts as an element of P depends on several factors: if we
describe the repeated coin toss by a set of Binomial distributions B(N, θ), then we also
assume that the tosses are i.i.d. and that we toss the coin exactly N times. The choice
of specific hypotheses such as H: θ = 1/2, H’: θ = 2/3, and so on, is only possible
after choosing a family of distributions for P .
This implies that the conditional degree of belief p(E|H) is not only conditional on
H, but also conditional on the general model M. Indeed, a Bayesian inference about
the probability of heads in the coin-tossing example takes M as given from the very
start. For the analysis in the previous section, whenever we wrote p(E|H), we should
have written p(E|H,M), strictly speaking.
The same diagnosis applies to the assignment of prior probabilities p(H): Bayesian
inference regarding particular parameter values is relative to a model M into which
all hypotheses are embedded (e.g., M = (S = {0, 1}N ;P = B(N, θ), θ ∈ [0, 1])). De-
grees of belief are distributed only over elements of P . In particular, also the prior and
posterior degrees of belief, p(H) and p(H|E), are relative to a modelM. For instance,
in a Binomial model, we distribute prior probabilities over the different values of θ,
and over no other statistical hypothesis. Of course, there are also hierarchical models
which involve sub-models of different types (e.g., the Binomial model vs. a model with
dependent outcomes), but this does not change the general diagnosis: all probabili-
ties in Bayesian inference are relative to a statistical model (see also Wenmackers and
Romeijn, 2016).
This observation connects to a classical problem of Bayesian inference. Standardly,
p(H) is interpreted as the prior degree of belief that H is true. However, many statis-
tical models are strong idealizations of reality. In those cases, it would be silly to have
a strictly positive degree of belief in the truth of a hypothesis (e.g., a particular global
climate model), even if it happens to make accurate predictions. It would be even more
silly to bet on the truth of any particular hypothesis, as operational interpretations of
subjective probability demand. Also the sample space that we use in statistical trials is
typically idealized: measurement instruments may have limited precision and reliabil-
ity, categorizing outcomes can be controversial (e.g., in the case of clinical disorders),
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and so on. For these reasons, Bayesian inference seems to be based on false and unre-
alistic premises: the interpretation of p(H) as the degree of belief that H is true fails
to make sense for many statistical models. In statistics, this is an issue shaping recent
debates about applying Bayesian inference to complex statistical models (Gelman and
Shalizi, 2013; Morey et al., 2013).
In a nutshell, we face the trilemma of having to reject one of the following three,
jointly inconsistent propositions:
(1) p(H) denotes an agent’s degree of belief that H is true.
(2) Such a hypothesis H is part of a general probabilistic modelM with a partition
of hypotheses H = {H, H1, H2, . . . , }.
(3) Many of these modelsM are strong idealizations of reality—and likely or known
to be false.
Since (2) and (3) are rather uncontentious and also part and parcel of scientific reason-
ing, we have to reject (1). There are various ways of doing so. For example, Vassend
(2017) defends the view that the subjective probability of H expresses the degree of
belief that H is most similar to the truth among all (false) hypotheses in M (see also
Niiniluoto, 2011; Cevolani and Tambolo, 2013). Instead, I propose a suppositional anal-
ysis: p(H|M) expresses the degree of belief in H that we would have if we supposed
that the target system is fully and correctly described by one of the hypotheses inM.
On this reading, the entire Bayesian inference is relative toM.
However, supposing M does not yield a uniquely rational value for p(H|M).
There is no objective chance of H in the hypothetical world ωM. Does this mean that
the suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief is not applicable to prior
degrees of belief?
The answer is no. It is the very essence of subjective Bayesian inference that differ-
ent rational choices of the prior distribution are possible. If p(H|M) were determined
in the same way as p(E|H,M), this feature of subjective Bayesian inference would
get lost. Moreover, the lack of unique determination by a probability density function
does not imply that “anything goes”, that all prior distributions are equally rational.
Given what we know about the target system, some hypotheses are more plausible
than others. For instance, almost nobody would assign a high prior to the hypothesis
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that an ordinary coin is highly biased towards heads (θ > .9), regardless of whether
she accepts or rejects the Binomial model as an adequate description of the coin toss.
A possible explication of the suppositional interpretation for prior probabilities con-
sists in adopting a broadly Lewisian perspective (Lewis, 1973): to determine the prior
probability of H as a function of the estimated similarity of ωH to the actual world ω@.
Of course, different agents can come up with different similarity rankings, dependent
on their goals, interests and the features of the target system they pick out as relevant.
This view of Bayesian inference squares well with the famous saying from statistics
that all models are wrong, but some are illuminating and useful (Box, 1976). Having a
prior (or posterior) over θ does not commit us to any degree of belief about the “true”
value of θ, or to betting on some propositions about θ with specific odds. It just makes
a statement about how our degrees of belief and betting odds would be if the coin toss
were fully described byM.
We now proceed to the remaining probabilities in Bayes’ Theorem. Also the
marginal likelihood p(E) = p(E|M) can be interpreted in a model-relative, suppo-
sitional way. In fact, this follows from the Law of Total Probability. p(E|M) is the
weighted average of the conditional probabilities of E, and thus our subjective expec-
tation that E occurs ifM is the case.
p(E|M) = ∑
Hi∈H
p(E|Hi,M) · p(Hi|M) (1)
Suppose thatM is an ensemble of hypotheses (e.g., global climate models) that make
statistical predictions for specific events such as E: “On emission scheme S, global
mean temperature in 2100 will be at least 2◦C higher than in 1990.” Suppose that
p(E|M) ≈ 1 because most hypotheses in M assign a high probability to E. Do these
predictions affect our actual epistemic attitudes regarding the occurrence of E? After
all, on the suppositional interpretation, all probabilities are relative to a statistical
model M. But we care for whether E is actually likely to occur, not whether it is
likely to occur given a certain model. In other words: how does the suppositional
analysis link model predictions to the real world? This question is especially urgent in
contexts such climate science, where doubts about the adequacy of large-scale models
for making probabilistic predictions are widespread:
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It is [...] inappropriate to apply any of the currently available generic
techniques which utilize observations to calibrate or weight models to pro-
duce forecast probabilities for the real world. (Stainforth et al., 2007, 2145)
In general, confidence in the predictions of a statistical modelM depends on whether
its constituents capture the relevant aspects of the target system. When the target sys-
tem is highly complex and hard to predict, we will have to preserve a healthy dose
of skepticism toward the predictions of M. On the other hand, the better the con-
stituents ofM describe relevant aspects of the target system, the more justification do
we have for an inference by analogy, and for transferring their predictions to our actual
epistemic attitudes. In this respect, Bayesian inference is just another form of model-
based reasoning in science (Weisberg, 2007; Frigg and Hartmann, 2012; Sua´rez, 2016).
According to the suppositional analysis, converting knowledge about the model into
knowledge about the target system is equally difficult for Bayesian and non-Bayesian
model builders.3
The interpretation of the posterior probability p(H|E,M) opens up new questions.
Why, and to which extent, are posterior probabilities constrained by the evidence?
In the model-relative version of Bayes’ Theorem, p(H|E,M) depends on p(E|H,M),
p(H|M) and p(E|M):
p(H|E,M) = p(H|M) p(E|H,M)
p(E|M) =
(
∑
Hi∈H
p(E|Hi,M)
p(E|H,M) ·
p(Hi|M)
p(H|M)
)−1
(2)
We see that the impact of p(H|M) on the posterior probability diminishes when there
is sufficiently strong evidence in favor of or against H, as expressed by the ratio of con-
ditional probabilities p(E|Hi,M)/p(E|H,M). The value of the posterior probability
p(H|E,M) is rationally constrained because (i) Bayes’ Theorem binds it to the value
of other conditional degrees of belief; (ii) the conditional degrees of belief in E given
the competing statistical hypotheses Hi, p(E|Hi,M), obey The Equality and track the
corresponding probability densities.
The model-relative version of Bayes Theorem’ deserves some further comments. It
3Moreover, Bayesian inference has some features that are useful in problematic contexts such as
climate science: one can hedge model error by embedding different types of models into a hierarchical
Bayesian model, and by averaging their predictions (e.g., Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007). This approach is, as
the above quote indicates, not without problems, but it is hard to come up with better alternatives.
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can be derived easily from applying Ratio Analysis to both p(E|H,M) and p(H|E,M).
Operationalized in terms of bets, this means the following: if we understand the above
probabilities as indicating fair odds for conditional bets that are called off if the propo-
sition behind the dash is false, then the only way to avoid Dutch books is to make
sure that one’s betting odds (and the implied probabilities) respect Equation (2)—the
model-relative version of Bayes’ Theorem. It is not about the definition of p(H|E,M),
but about its coherence with other probabilities: it states how the different functions
that represent our conditional degrees of belief (p(·|M), p(·|H,M) and p(·|E,M))
need to coordinate in order to avoid a Dutch book. This is in fact very similar to the
standard justification of Bayes’ Theorem and Ratio Analysis (see Section 3). But now,
rather than coordinating degrees of belief described by a single probability function,
Bayes’ Theorem coordinates different probability functions.
Most primers and encyclopedia entries on Bayesian inference describe the theo-
rem as “a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities”
(Joyce, 2008), that is, as a practical tool for being able to perform Bayesian inference
and to compute posterior probabilities. On the suppositional analysis, it is more than
that; it emerges as an epistemic coordination principle with genuine philosophical
significance.
Note that Equation (2) is a synchronic, not a diachronic constraint: it describes
the conditional degree of belief in H, given E and M, not the degree of belief in
H, given M and after learning E. Only when it is conjoined with Conditionalization
pE(H|M) = p(H|E,M), we obtain a rule for describing how our degrees of belief
should change after a learning experience. Conditionalization emerges as an infer-
ence which connects two different modes of reasoning: learning E and supposing E.
Exploring this connection is a topic for future research.4
In sum, Bayesian inference should be construed as a model-relative activity where
we reason with counterfactual, and not with actual degrees of belief. As I have argued,
4For instance, one may ask how learning the observation E∗ affects the conditional degree of belief in
E, pE
∗
(E|H)? In a nutshell, the answer is that we evaluate this probability relative to the counterfactual
world ωH , taking into account the occurrence of E∗ within that world. Sometimes pE
∗
(E|H,M) will just
be equal to p(E|H,M). For instance, if E and E∗ denote two i.i.d. tosses of a coin, then H screens off
both observations from each other and equality holds: pE
∗
(E|H,M) = p(E|H,M). In other cases, E∗
may be informative and determine the conditional degree of belief in E. Time series are a good example.
ConsiderM : Yt = Yt−1 + Xt with Xt ∈ {−1, 1} and the hypothesis H: p(Xt = 1) = 1/2. If E∗ : Yt−1 = 3
and E: Yt = 4, then we can directly calculate that pE
∗
(E|H,M) = 1/2. (The other possible observation is
Yt = 2.)
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this neither impairs the functionality of Bayesian reasoning nor its normative pull.
By contrast, the suppositional analysis leads to a more unified picture that resolves
some persistent puzzles such as the problem of chance-credence coordination, and the
interpretation of prior probabilities in statistical inference.
All this suggests that conditional degree of belief might be a more fruitful primi-
tive notion in Bayesian reasoning than unconditional degree of belief. This diagnosis
resonates well with Ha´jek’s (2003) analysis of conditional probability. If we aim at a
mathematical basis that is congenial to the epistemic applications, we need to replace
Kolmogorov’s three standard axioms (p(⊥) = 0; p(A) + p(¬A) = 1; p(∨∞n=1An) =
∑∞n=1 p(An) for mutually exclusive An) by an axiom system that takes conditional
probability as primitive, such as the Popper-Re´nyi axioms (Popper, 1959/2002; Re´nyi,
1970; Fitelson and Ha´jek, 2017). Unconditional probability can then be obtained as a
limiting case of conditional probability. Another way is to define conditional probabil-
ity in terms of an expectation conditional on a random variable (Gyenis et al., 2017). It
is up to future work to determine which road is the most promising one.
6 Conclusion
This paper set out to justify The Equality: why do conditional degrees of belief in an
observation, given a statistical hypothesis, track the corresponding probability densi-
ties? In other words, why is p(E|H) = ρH(E)? I have argued that the suppositional
analysis of conditional degree of belief provides the key to answering this question,
and that it aligns well with our intuitive handling of conditional probabilities. On top
of this, it explains the role of chance-credence coordination in scientific reasoning, the
role of priors in highly idealized models, and the epistemic function of Bayes’ Theo-
rem. Moreover, it applies naturally to central debates in confirmation theory and the
philosophy of probability, such as the Problem of Old Evidence. For example, Howson
(1984, 1985) and Sprenger (2015) propose to solve that problem by means of counter-
factually interpreted conditional probabilities. Other promising applications are the
epistemology of conditionals and the role of conditional probability in theories of ob-
jective chance (for recent contributions, see Douven, 2016; Sua´rez, 2017). All in all, the
suppositional analysis leads to a novel and innovative perspective on foundations and
practice of Bayesian inference.
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Finally, I would like to state the main results of the paper. Some of them may,
taken individually, also be articulated elsewhere, but I am aware of no place where a
coherent and unified picture is offered.
1. Ratio Analysis is a mathematical constraint on conditional degree of belief, but
not a satisfactory philosophical analysis.
2. Conditional degrees of belief of the type p(E|H), with observation E and statis-
tical hypothesis H, should be embedded into the context of a general statistical
model M and be interpreted in the suppositional (and possibly counterfactual)
way anticipated by Ramsey: we suppose that M and H are true and reason on
this basis about the probability of E.
3. The Equality follows directly from the suppositional interpretation: conditional
degrees of belief in an observation given a statistical hypothesis track the corre-
sponding probability densities.
4. The suppositional analysis explains the seemingly analytical nature of many
probability statements in science, and it agrees with how scientists view prob-
abilities in inference: as objective, but hypothetical entities. Statistical inference
need not be committed to particular interpretations of objective chance.
5. The suppositional analysis clarifies the role of chance-credence coordination prin-
ciples in scientific inference, such as the Principal Principle or the Principle of
Direct Inference.
6. The suppositional analysis explains the normative pull of Bayesian inference,
by contributing to agreement on the value of Bayesian measures of evidential
support such as the Bayes factor.
7. All probabilities in Bayesian inference are conditional degrees of belief: they are
conditional on assuming a general (statistical) model. This position successfully
deals with the objection that we should never assign positive degrees of belief to
a hypothesis when we know it to be wrong.
8. Bayes’ Theorem expresses an epistemic coordination principle for various prob-
ability functions that describe conditional degrees of belief.
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9. Bayesian Conditionalization relates the posterior degrees of belief (learning E) to
conditional degrees of belief (supposing E).
10. When it comes to transferring model predictions to the real world, the sup-
positional analysis makes Bayesian inference analogous to other model-based
reasoning strategies in science.
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